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Evaluating the Social Effects of Environmental Leadership Programs* 
 
Jonathan C. Borck 
Cary Coglianese 
Jennifer Nash 
 
 
Over the past decade, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and more 
than 20 states have established environmental leadership programs (ELPs), a type of 
voluntary environmental program with the explicit goal of improving the environmental 
performance of private-sector facilities.1  EPA’s National Environmental Performance 
Track, considered by many to be the nation’s flagship ELP, now boasts more than 500 
member facilities that have voluntarily implemented environmental management systems 
and set goals for their environmental performance that go beyond meeting legal 
requirements.  Similar state programs include the Partnership for a Sustainable Georgia, 
Tennessee’s Pollution Prevention Partnership, and Virginia’s Environmental Excellence 
Program. 
As a condition for the recognition and rewards that come with membership in 
ELPs, facilities must submit application materials to the government demonstrating that 
they meet specified entry criteria.  As part of their applications, facilities show that they 
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1 Jonathan Borck et al., Environmental Leadership Programs: Toward an Empirical Assessment of Their 
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have implemented systematic management practices and are committed to improving 
their environmental performance in areas such as water and energy conservation and 
habitat protection.  Many programs also require businesses to establish community 
outreach programs as a condition for membership, and nearly all programs require 
facilities to inform the public on a regular basis about the environmental impacts of their 
operations.2 
Although ELPs primarily seek to promote better environmental performance by 
industry,3 they also have been designed to advance a variety of social goals, such as 
improving relationships between businesses, communities, and government agencies, and 
diffusing a more responsible ethos throughout corporate culture.4  In creating its 
Performance Track program, for example, EPA aspired to “transform” its relationships 
with industry, making them more “collaborative, cooperative, and focused on results.”5  
Performance Track seeks to do so by moving beyond the traditional wielding of negative 
sanctions against rule-breakers, and instead by having EPA recognize and reward 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL OF THE STATES (ECOS), SURVEY OF STATE SUPPORT FOR 
PERFORMANCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED 
EFFECTIVENESS 1, 4 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/downloads/ECOS_Report_Final_01-
13-05.pdf  (“The fundamental goal of Performance Track and other state innovation programs is to achieve 
better environmental results.”).  
4 See, e.g., DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 206 (2006) (stating that “a 
principal justification for . . . beyond-compliance programs like EPA’s Performance Track” is “to build a 
foundation for increased trust among the actors in the regulatory system”).  For a discussion of how 
environmental management systems – a core requirement for membership in almost any ELP – can 
promote social goals, see William R. Moomaw, Expanding the Concept of Environmental Management 
Systems to Meet Multiple Social Goals, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?  126-45 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
5 U.S. EPA, BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION: PERFORMANCE TRACK SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 3 
(2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/PT_2nd_progress_rpt_FINAL.pdf.  See also U.S. EPA, 
BUILDING TRUST WITH PERFORMANCE, available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/members/downloads/ 
PTwaterincentives_reducedmonitoringpaper.pdf (noting that Performance Track “was designed in part to 
foster greater cooperation between regulated facilities and their state and federal regulators”). 
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businesses that engage in responsible environmental conduct.6  In addition, by requiring 
that Performance Track members engage in community outreach, EPA hopes to spur 
increased confidence and trust by local organizations and citizens in their business 
neighbors.7  EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson has declared that Performance Track’s 
positive approach is “fundamentally strengthening the relationship between business and 
government.”8 
State governments have similarly established environmental leadership programs 
with social goals in mind. The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) has declared 
that these programs can help “foster greater collaboration between environmental 
regulatory agencies and high-performing companies.”9  At two recent workshops about 
ELPs organized by EPA, ECOS, and the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental 
Performance (MSWG), participants spoke extensively about the importance of improving 
relationships, enhancing trust, and changing culture.10  In interviews we conducted with 
state ELP managers, officials voiced support for the goals of improving relationships and 
changing the culture of businesses and government agencies.11 
Businesses also give priority to ELPs’ social goals. According to membership 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Performance Track Places Trust in the Carrot Over the Stick, 10 ENVTL. 
QUALITY MGMT. 9 (2001). 
7 As an employee of a Performance Track member has asserted, the program “establishes a climate of 
respect and trust with the community.  It keeps the people who live near you comfortable that you are not 
polluting.”  U.S. EPA, LEADING CHANGE: PERFORMANCE TRACK FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 22 
(2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/downloads/PT_4th_Progress_Report.pdf.  
8 U.S. EPA, Performance Track Celebrates Five Years of Environmental Leadership, 
http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/5thAnniversary.htm (quoting Administrator Johnson). 
9 ECOS, supra note 3, at 7. 
10 Angela Vituli & Eric Ruder, Summary of the May 8th Dialogue on Performance-Based Environmental 
Programs (2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Hetal Jain, MSWG’s “International 
Dialogue on Ecological Policy”: Notes on Dialogue on Defining, Measuring, and Communicating Results 
of Performance-Based Programs (2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Eric Ruder, 
State and Federal Performance-Based Environmental Programs: Assessing the Potential for Evaluation – 
Statement of Research Questions and Program Goals (2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
authors). 
11 Borck et al., supra note 1. 
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surveys that EPA conducted in 2004 and 2006, participants in Performance Track 
reported that social effects provide much of the value they receive from participation. In 
response to the 2004 survey, for example, members reported that their most important 
reason for joining and staying in the program was to enjoy a “collaborative/amicable 
relationship with EPA [and s]tates.”12
 
 The 2006 survey showed that most respondents 
believed that Performance Track participation had contributed to a “culture of continuous 
environmental improvement” and had improved their facility’s “relationship with 
EPA.”13 Of course, the primacy that ELP members place on social goals should not be 
surprising, given that ELPs are voluntary programs. Businesses that choose to join are 
those willing to reach out to the government and those that find beneficial the 
opportunities the programs afford for engaging with representatives of agencies and 
community organizations.14 
In bringing facility managers, community residents, environmental advocacy 
organizations, and government environmental agencies into closer contact through 
meetings and other mechanisms for information sharing, ELPs clearly aim to transform 
traditional adversarial relationships into more cooperative modes of interacting. The 
implications of such a shift, if achieved, could be substantial, as new perspectives and 
best practices could begin to permeate facility walls and transform both business and 
government agencies.15
 
 It is also conceivable, though, that ELPs could negatively affect 
                                                 
12 Abt Associates Inc., Results of 2004 Performance Track Customer Satisfaction Survey, 
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/members/news/mar05/survey_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
13 U.S. EPA, 2006 PERFORMANCE TRACK SURVEY: SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS, PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
(2006). 
14 See Jennifer A. Howard-Grenville et al., Constructing the License to Operate: Internal Factors and Their 
Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 30 LAW & POL’Y 73  (2008) (reporting evidence that 
participants in Performance Track are more extroverted than non-participants). 
15 Andrew A. King, The Role of Management Systems in Stakeholder Partnerships, in LEVERAGING THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
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relationships and the regulatory culture. This could happen if ELPs raise expectations for 
cooperation that are not met, or if repeated interactions provide greater opportunities for 
disagreement or miscommunication, with the possible unintended result of increasing 
levels of mistrust among stakeholders. Especially if agencies promise benefits to 
participants that they fail to deliver, or if facilities fail to live up to the commitments they 
make, relationships could be damaged rather than strengthened. It is also conceivable that 
most programs’ commitments not to subject members to routine regulatory inspections 
could raise public suspicions and exacerbate public mistrust of both agencies and 
facilities. For example, when EPA moved to bolster benefits for Performance Track 
participants in 2005, environmental groups complained that the Agency was improperly 
trading away needed regulations and enforcement authority to induce facilities to join.16   
The possibility that ELPs could either succeed or fail in improving regulatory 
relationships and culture motivates the question we address in this paper: How can 
agencies (or anyone) measure and evaluate ELPs’ social contributions? Agencies have 
put a great deal of work into developing environmental performance metrics for ELPs, 
collecting environmental performance data from member facilities and compiling data 
into summary reports purporting to show these programs’ direct contributions to 
environmental protection.17
 
 Much less attention has focused on establishing social 
impact measures and collecting social performance data.18
 
 Therefore, this paper outlines 
                                                                                                                                                 
228-45 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1995). 
16 Letter from John Walke, National Resources Defense Council, to U.S. EPA Docket ID OA-2005-0003 
(Nov. 3, 2005);  Letter from Eric Schaeffer et al., President, Environmental Integrity Project, to Stephen 
Johnson, EPA Administrator (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/performance_track_letter_jan06.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2008). 
17 Borck et al., supra note 1. 
18 Id. 
- 5 - 
what would be needed to demonstrate with confidence that ELPs achieve their social 
goals successfully. While we focus on the social goals of improving relationships and 
regulatory culture, the basic issues we raise apply equally to evaluating the contributions 
of these programs to achieving any other goal, whether it be achieving traditional 
environmental improvements, integrating environmental concerns into business 
decisionmaking, or realizing other policy objectives.  
  
Measurement Issues: Defining and Operationalizing Social Goals 
 
An initial hurdle in evaluating ELPs’ progress toward social goals is to clarify 
what is meant by a “social goal” and develop appropriate performance measures. While 
environmental goals are themselves not always easy to define, for the most part they are 
based on the consequences of economic inputs and can be operationalized using outputs 
that can be isolated, measured, and tracked, such as emissions or energy usage. But what, 
exactly, does it mean to “improve relationships” among facilities, agencies, and 
surrounding communities? Or to “change culture” or “enhance trust”? Investigators 
cannot directly observe these phenomena—no “culture-o-meter” or “trust-o-meter” 
exists. In these cases, investigators must identify proxy variables that are correlated or 
associated with the underlying social variables of concern.  
Proxy variables can fall into one of two categories: (1) revealed proxies; and (2) 
expressed proxies. Revealed proxies are measures of actual observable behavior 
consistent with the underlying social variables of concern. Revealed proxies are closely 
related to the concept of revealed preferences in economics: they are measures of real-
- 6 - 
world behavior that reflect the preferences and attitudes of the actors.19  Examples of 
revealed proxies for improving relationships might be the number of complaints 
community residents make to or about an industrial facility or the number of lawsuits 
filed by groups against polluters. 
In contrast, expressed proxies are measures of actors’ stated opinions. Expressed 
proxies are closely related to the concept of stated preferences in economics: they are 
measures of actors’ preferences determined by their words, not their actions. An example 
of a stated proxy for improving relationships might be the responses to a survey question 
asking environmental or community organizations how much they trust industry or 
government regulators.20   
The problems with revealed proxies are that they are limited in availability and 
may be more closely related to factors other than the underlying variable of concern. The 
range of observable behavior is naturally limited. Businesses, regulators, and 
environmental and community groups engage in only a few observable actions plausibly 
related to an underlying social effect. And when they do, these actions are necessarily 
indirect measures of the underlying social variables of concern. Investigators must be 
aware of the possibility that the variation in a specific revealed proxy is related less to the 
underlying social effect than to some other factor or influence. For example, the number 
of lawsuits filed by environmental groups against polluters could be explained more (or 
entirely) by changes in groups’ finances than by changes in underlying levels of trust or 
improvements in relationships. Investigators do not need to abandon such revealed 
                                                 
19 CHARLES KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 297 (2000); U.S. EPA, Guidelines for Preparing 
Economics Analyses §7.5, http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0228C-07.pdf/$File/EE-
0228C-07.pdf. 
20 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 356-64; U.S. EPA, supra note 19. 
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proxies. Rather, they can use statistical techniques to account for these alternative 
explanations. But the issue certainly complicates efforts to identify the effects of ELPs.  
Unlike revealed proxies, which are indirect and limited in availability, expressed 
proxies are readily obtainable and can be quite direct: investigators can ask directly about 
any underlying social variable of concern. But they simply cannot be sure that the 
responses they receive are accurate reflections of the true feelings or views of the 
respondents. Opinions obtained through surveys or interviews are prone to numerous 
biases that have been well documented in various literatures.21  For example, respondents 
can be swayed by the range of options in survey questions or by the first option provided 
in an interview. Respondents might respond strategically to a survey question to 
influence a perceived outcome. Respondents can also be influenced by the amount and 
nature of background information provided in a survey or interview or by external 
factors, such as the weather on the day they answer the survey or conduct the interview, 
that are entirely irrelevant to the questions being asked. Researchers are actively 
developing methods to elicit more truthful (or less biased) responses to survey or 
interview questions, and techniques have improved immensely from the earliest days of 
survey research.22  But implementing these improved methods to collect expressed 
proxies is both time-consuming and expensive. 
Another, more fundamental challenge with both revealed and expressed proxies is 
that being that they are proxies, the direction of any correlation between the proxy and 
                                                 
21 Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success?: Evaluating Public Participation in Regulatory Policymaking, 
in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 69-86 (Rosemary 
O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham, eds., 2003); TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 38-40 (7th  ed. 2006). 
22 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 356-64; TIETENBERG, supra note 21, at 38-40; Paul Portney, The Contingent 
Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 3. 
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the underlying variable of concern can be unclear. Is the proxy negatively or positively 
correlated with the underlying variable? For example, an improved relationship might 
mean one with less conflict, perhaps measured by the number of complaints community 
residents make to or about an industrial facility. Or an improved relationship might mean 
one with more interaction, in which case an increase in the number of complaints might 
signal first steps in developing relationships that will eventually overcome the problems 
or misperceptions that underlie the complaints. Similarly, researchers might measure the 
quality of communication by counting the number of hours facility managers spend in 
meetings with agencies and other stakeholders. But then again, lengthy meetings could 
also indicate that facility and agency managers have reached an impasse and are no 
longer listening to each other. Finally, trust might be shown through managers’ 
willingness to disclose large quantities of information about their environmental 
performance to community residents. On the other hand, being on the receiving end of a 
large “data dump” could feel like bombardment and perhaps only reinforce feelings of 
mistrust. In each of these cases, investigators can observe plausible proxies for the 
underlying social variables of concern, but it may not always be clear whether changes in 
the level of the proxy indicate improvement or deterioration in the underlying social goal. 
The desire to understand whether an ELP leads to some improvement gives rise to 
an added measurement challenge: namely, the proxies gathered to assess progress toward 
social goals should be collected not only from or about participants in the ELP but also 
from an appropriate sample of non-participants.23  Some revealed or expressed proxies 
may be readily obtainable from businesses, regulators, and environmental and community 
groups both within and outside a program. For example, investigators can presumably 
                                                 
23 JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS §13 (2d ed. 2007). 
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obtain a count of the number of lawsuits filed by community or environmental groups 
against polluters, whether or not the groups and polluters are involved in the ELP. On the 
other hand, some proxies may be more difficult to obtain from non-participants. For 
example, managers of facilities participating in an ELP might readily respond to a 
program-sponsored survey asking them about trust in government regulators because of 
its obvious relevance, but nonparticipating facilities may be less likely to respond to a 
request to complete such a survey. Obtaining data from both types of facilities, however, 
is essential to draw proper inferences about any program’s impact.  
 
Inference Issues: Determining the True Effects of an ELP 
 
 Determining how well an ELP achieves its goals involves more than just 
measuring progress toward the goals, even if appropriate proxy measures can be 
identified and collected. Investigators must use techniques to assess whether any progress 
they observe is actually the result of the program itself, or whether some other factor 
explains the results. They should be particularly aware of two confounding effects: (1) 
the “Hawthorne effect”; and (2) omitted variables bias.  
The Hawthorne effect draws its name from a study of worker productivity 
conducted in the early part of the 20th century at the Western Electric Company’s facility 
in Hawthorne, Illinois.24  The effect refers to the potential for study subjects to act or 
respond differently just because they know they are being studied. In the Hawthorne 
experiments, researchers varied working conditions (such as lighting, schedules, and so 
forth) in an effort to determine how these conditions affected worker productivity. They 
found that over time, the productivity of the experimental group always increased—
                                                 
24 Id.;  F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939). 
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regardless of the changes made to workplace conditions.25  The Hawthorne effect 
reminds researchers that the very fact that members of a treatment group know they are 
part of an experiment and are being observed may influence how they perform or 
respond. The potential for the Hawthorne effect is undoubtedly inherent in any voluntary 
program like ELPs. Researchers need to be mindful of the possibility that any effects that 
appear to have come from participating in the program under study may simply have 
come about because participating facilities knew they were in a program and were being 
observed.  
The problem of omitted variables bias occurs when one or more factors left out of 
an analysis—usually because it is difficult or impossible to observe them—have an 
important effect on the observed responses or outcomes.26  In such cases, the risk is that 
the effect of an omitted variable will be incorrectly ascribed to the variable measured and 
included in the analysis. For example, when investigators analyze the effects of 
participating in an ELP on some proxy for trust of stakeholders, they may leave one or 
more important variables out of their analysis, perhaps inadvertently, but more likely 
because it is difficult to gather data on all the variables that might influence the proxy. 
One such variable could be the degree of top-level management support for 
environmental activities. Not only might a facility’s degree of top-level management 
support influence its level of trust of other stakeholders as measured after it joined an 
ELP, but that top-level management support might likely influence whether a facility 
                                                 
25 ROETHLISBERGER & DICKSON, supra note 24. 
26 STOCK & WATSON, supra note 23, §6; JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A 
MODERN APPROACH §3.4 (2d ed. 2003). 
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joins an ELP in the first place.27  If facilities’ preexisting levels of top-level management 
support are not accounted for in a study of the social effects of ELPs, any higher level of 
trust observed among participants could appear to have been caused by participation in 
the ELP itself when, in fact, some (if not all) of the difference was due to the preexisting 
degree of top-level management support for the environment among participants. An 
analysis of trust will not reveal the true effect of participation in the program if the 
omitted variable is never taken into account.  
One way to attack the omitted variables bias problem and isolate the true effect of 
an ELP is to find a suitable proxy variable for the omitted variable. These proxies are 
slightly different from the proxies discussed in the section above. There, we discussed 
types of proxies for the underlying social effect of interest or what we might call the 
outcome of concern. Here, we seek proxies for unobservable variables that influence the 
outcome of concern. But the ideas and the challenges are the same in both cases. For 
example, a proxy variable for the omitted variable of facilities’ preexisting levels of top-
level management support could take the form of responses to survey questions that had 
been administered before the ELP was established. Under certain statistical conditions, 
this proxy variable can be used to control for the unobserved variable and help isolate the 
true effect of the ELP.28 
Another way to tackle the omitted variables bias problem in a statistical setting is 
the so-called instrumental variables technique.29  Unlike a proxy variable, which is a 
                                                 
27 Other research, in fact, shows that the degree of top-level management support is strongly associated 
with participation in voluntary environmental programs.  See Jonathan C. Borck et al., Why Do They Join?  
An Exploration of Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs, in BEYOND COMPLIANCE: 
BUSINESS DECISION MAKING AND THE U.S. EPA’S PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM (Regulatory Policy 
Program Report No. RPP-10, 2006). 
28 WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 26, §9.2. 
29 STOCK & WATSON, supra note 23, §12; WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 26, §15. 
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variable correlated with the unobservable omitted variable, an instrumental variable is a 
variable correlated with participation in the ELP. Under certain conditions, the 
instrumental variable technique can be used to isolate the true effect of the program.30  
The method of instrumental variables is well known but challenging to implement, as it 
requires some known randomness in at least one factor affecting the voluntary decision to 
participate in a program like an ELP.31   
A more straightforward way to address the omitted variables bias problem is to 
use the “differences-in-differences” method. Differences-in-differences is one of a class 
of statistical approaches that use data collected over multiple time periods.32  The 
differences-in-differences technique requires investigators to collect data on participants 
and non-participants in a program in two time periods: (1) before the program; and (2) 
after the program. The method assumes that participants would change over time the 
same way the non-participants did if they never joined the program. If so, then any 
additional change in the outcome variable or effect of concern among the participants can 
be inferred to have been due to the influence of the program itself.33  For example, 
suppose that investigators observed that the reported level of trust among a sample of 
managers from participating facilities increased by a certain amount after the facilities 
joined an ELP. Moreover, suppose the investigators observed that trust also increased 
among a sample of facilities that did not participate in the program over the same time 
period. The differences-in-differences technique allows the research to conclude that the 
                                                 
30 STOCK & WATSON, supra note 23, §12; WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 26, §15. 
31 Lori Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Measuring Progress: Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies, 
ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 2005, at 22. 
32 WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 26, §13; STOCK & WATSON, supra note 23, §13. 
33 Cary Coglianese & Lori Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-
Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 
RESEARCH PRIORITIES (Gary D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005). 
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effect of the ELP is the additional increase in trust among participants, not the total 
increase in trust.34  The method provides not only a better estimate of the effect of the 
program but also a more confident one. It helps to rule out alternative explanations, such 
as a preexisting but unobservable levels or propensities to trust.  
Note that all the statistical techniques described above require gathering data 
about facilities or other actors that are not involved in the program. These non-
participants serve as the control group; that is, they provide a basis for estimating what 
participants would have done in the absence of the program (the “counterfactual”).35  
Without a properly chosen sample of non-participants against which to compare the 
behavior and evolution of participants, investigators cannot confidently estimate how 
much progress an ELP is making toward its goals—social or otherwise. 
The data needs are even more extensive to implement the powerful differences-in-
differences technique. Investigators must collect four chunks of relevant data from: (1) 
the participants before they joined the program; (2) the participants after they joined the 
program; (3) a sample of non-participants before the participants joined the program; and 
(4) a sample of non-participants after the participants joined the program. Investigators 
who only collect data from participants in an ELP after they have joined the program 
have only collected one of the four chunks of data required to implement the differences-
in-differences approach and thereby gain a best estimate of the true effect of the ELP.  
Of course, in mentioning these statistical techniques, we do not mean to imply 
that the social effects of ELPs can only be studied through large samples using advanced 
quantitative analytic tools. Important insights can also be obtained through in-depth study 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002, U. ILL. L. REV. 1111-37. 
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of smaller numbers of facilities or programs. Yet, the challenges we have discussed about 
measurement and inference still arise. Fortunately, qualitative or small-sample research 
can also be designed in ways that respond effectively to these challenges.36 
 
Linking Social Effects to Environmental Performance 
 
 Up to this point, we have been primarily concerned with social effects or 
outcomes themselves, as if these effects are intrinsically valuable. Perhaps they are, in 
that people may be happier to live and work in communities in which relationships 
among stakeholders are strong and cultures within businesses and government agencies 
are cooperative. However, there seems to be good reason to suppose that many 
policymakers and managers quite properly view social effects as simply a means to the 
larger end of improved environmental protection. After all, most agencies implementing 
ELPs are environmental protection agencies, not social capital-building agencies.  
 If social effects are important primarily because of their subsequent effects on 
environmental quality, for example, because firms that garner greater trust tend to be the 
ones that take greater strides to improve their environmental performance, then 
identifying and obtaining good measures of and inferences about social effects will not be 
enough. In addition to the measurement and inference challenges we have already 
discussed, researchers and policy analysts will also confront challenges in determining 
the association between social effects and environmental outcomes. Some of these 
challenges will be familiar. For example, to determine if any observed changes in social 
effects lead to changes in environmental outcomes, researchers will face measurement 
challenges, such as the need to identify and collect measures not only of social effects but 
                                                 
36 GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
(1994). 
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also environmental outcomes. Unfortunately, not all environmental outcomes are 
regularly or reliably measured. Thus, investigators must use those measures that are 
available, such as EPA’s toxic release inventory (TRI), as proxies for overall 
environmental performance. As with all proxies, investigators must be aware that the 
proxies may not be highly correlated with the underlying outcome of concern, in this case 
overall environmental performance. Reported TRI figures, for example, may provide at 
best only a partial indicator of facilities’ aggregate levels of pollution and their overall 
environmental performance, especially when that performance is understood to include 
energy and water use, among other things.37 
 Familiar issues of inference also complicate the linking of social outcomes to 
overall environmental performance. As is true for any research issue, correlation is not 
the same as causation.38  Just because investigators observe that facilities with greater 
levels of various social indicators or variables also have superior environmental 
performance does not mean that the increase in levels of social indicators or variables led 
to the superior environmental performance. For one thing, superior environmental 
performance might be what leads to increases in levels of social variables, not the other 
way around. Cleaner firms may prompt, and generate for themselves, greater trust. 
Furthermore, an unobserved third variable—the familiar “omitted variable” described 
above—may be responsible for both observed effects in the social and environmental 
variables. In other words, there may be something else—perhaps effective managerial 
                                                 
37 For a discussion of the strengths and limitations of TRI data, see JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION 
THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY 
PROGRAM (2005) and Lori S. Bennear, Strategic Response to Regulatory Thresholds: Evidence From the 
Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act (June 27, 2005) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=776504. 
38 WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 26, §1.4. 
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leadership—that promotes both greater trust and improved environmental performance. 
Researchers and policy decisionmakers must be particularly careful to consider, and try 
to rule out, alternative explanations and causal pathways before crediting improvements 
in multi-stakeholder relationships, increases in trust, or changes in organizational culture 
with any observed improvements in environmental performance.  
 
Conclusion: A Path Forward 
 
Evaluating the effects of any public program—not just ELPs—requires attention 
to the kind of issues we have discussed in this paper.39  These issues also arise no matter 
what the goals of the program may be. For this reason, no one interested in ELPs should 
think that the challenges in evaluating these programs will necessarily be any easier when 
the goals are defined in social rather than environmental terms. Any well-executed and 
meaningful evaluation of ELPs—whether for their impact on social or environmental 
goals—will need to attend to these concerns. In other words, it will never suffice simply 
to poll program members to see if they are satisfied with the program or if they think it is 
having social or environmental effects.40  These effects need to be demonstrated through 
careful empirical research that attends to the issues we have outlined here.  
Even though such research can be a daunting task, it is not impossible. Our 
discussion of evaluation challenges suggests ways to design evaluations that will yield 
convincing results. For example, investigators should first take care to identify plausible 
proxies for the underlying social effects of concern. Identifying and collecting multiple 
proxies for a single social effect or outcome can increase the level of confidence that the 
                                                 
39 See Coglianese, supra note 21; Bennear & Coglianese, supra note 31; and LAWRENCE B. MOHR, IMPACT 
ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION (2d ed. 1995). 
40 Coglianese, supra note 21. 
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proxies are measuring the right effect, especially when the direction of correlation 
between a single proxy variable and the underlying social effect or outcome is unclear.  
If investigators are primarily interested in social effects as a means to 
improvements in environmental performance, they should take care to link the social 
effect to environmental performance explicitly. To improve the confidence in making 
inferences about the effects of ELPs, investigators should be sure to collect data both 
from participants in the program and an appropriate sample of non-participants. Since 
some of the most powerful inference techniques require data from before the participants 
joined the program, investigators may wish to focus evaluations on industrial sectors or 
groups of facilities that have not yet joined a particular program and follow them as they 
join. Taking these evaluation issues into account before establishing new ELPs could 
provide opportunities for collecting pre-program data that can be used to compare to 
post-program outcomes or responses.  
Overall, investigators must be aware of and transparent about alternative 
explanations for any correlations they observe. Only by addressing the issues we have 
outlined in this paper can researchers and regulatory officials rule out alternative 
explanations for their results and thereby increase confidence in what they can conclude 
about ELPs’ success in achieving their goals—social or otherwise.  
 
